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A Suggested Proposal to Apportion Liability in Lead
Pigment Cases
I_ INTRODUCTION
A Case in Point
Three years ago, Monica and her one-year-old daughter, Julie,'
moved into a rented three bedroom brick house constructed in the
1940's. At the time they moved in, Julie was a bright, cheerful,
active, and playful child. Approximately six months later, however,
Monica began to notice that her daughter was often cranky and
irritable. Over the next six months, Julie's irritability increased so
much that she no longer desired to go outside to play.
When Monica mentioned these symptoms to Julie's pediatrician,
he performed a physical examination. Although the physician
concluded that Julie was merely suffering from "the terrible twos,"
the child's crankiness and irritability persisted. In addition, she
began to suffer gastrointestinal problems and lethargy. Repeated
trips to Julie's pediatrician revealed nothing further. Finally, more
than two years after Julie and Monica moved into the house, Julie's
pediatrician tested her blood. The test revealed that her blood
contained highly elevated lead levels. Julie had become one of
approximately 930,000 American children diagnosed with lead
poisoning, a disease that can result in serious childhood
developmental problems.
2
1. While the introductory story is based in part on an actual case, the names used are
fictional
2. MOVING TowARws A LEAD SAM AmEmucA, A RPOirr TO THE CONGRK. OF THE UNrrEDI
STATEm U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of lead Hazard Control
(1997) ("HUD REPORT TO CONGRESS"). The report summarized steps taken by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD'), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
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Following Julie's diagnosis, Monica immediately informed her
landlord of the lead problem. The local health department tested
the house for the presence of lead-based paint, finding high levels
of lead in its painted surfaces. Julie subsequently underwent
treatment at a local hospital, resulting in a slight decrease in her
lead levels. X-rays revealed the presence of lead in Julie's bones;
and neurological tests revealed significant developmental delays.
Eventually, Julie and Monica retained a lawyer who offered two
options: institute proceedings against the landlord or attempt to sue
the manufacturers of the lead pigment used in the paint Each
option, however, was imperfect. The primary obstacle for Julie and
Monica proved to be that the landlord's liability insurance might
not cover their claim.3 In addition, Monica neither knew which
brand of paint was used in the house, nor could she identify the
manufacturers of the lead pigment. Her lawyer explained that if
they were unable to identify the proper defendant, it was unlikely
an action could proceed. Monica was understandably upset. Her
daughter had suffered permanent damage due to exposure to a
defective product, and she had no viable cause of action to recover
damages for the special schooling, training, and medication Julie
would require throughout her life.
('CDC"), and Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA") to help reduce the occurrence of
childhood lead poisoning. Id. The report discusses lead paint hazard reduction, lead
exposure reduction, research and development efforts, and environmental studies on
childhood lead poisoning. Id.
3. Insurance companies have also recognized the problem with childhood lead
poisoning. ROBERT K RAINER & CHRIS A MnLNE, LEAD POISONING LrIGATION: CONCEPrs,
STRATEoms, AND PRAcTIcE, 119-20 (1995). In many cases, they have responded by adding an
exclusion for injuries caused by lead-based paint to their Comprehensive General Liability
("CGL") policies. Id, In other cases, insurers rely on the so-called "absolute pollution
exclusion" to deny coverage. Id. at 120. A standard absolute pollution exclusion clause
states:
This insurance does not apply to: (1) 'Bodily injury' or 'property damage' arising out
of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or
escape of pollutants (a) At or from any premises you own, rent or occupy;, (2)
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids,
alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned
or reclaimed.
Id. at 120.
The appearance of lead exclusions is relatively recent, possibly in response to a split
among courts in deciding whether the absolute pollution exclusion applies to claims for lead
poisoning arising from ingestion of lead-based paint. Some cases hold that lead is not a
"pollutant" within the meaning of the exclusion. See Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. McFadden,
595 N.E.2d 762 (Mass. 1992); Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617 (Md. 1995). Other
courts have held that lead is a "pollutant" within the meaning of the policy. See St. Leger v.
American Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 870 F Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1994), qff'd, 61 F3d 896 (3d
Cir. 1995).
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Unfortunately, Monica and Julie's case is not unique. The number
of similar cases in the United States probably numbers in the
thousands.4 Under current law, it is virtually impossible for
plaintiffs to recover damages from manufacturers of dangerous lead
pigment used in residential paint manufactured before 1978. This
inequity is extreme and should not continue. Victimized children,
innocent of any wrongdoing, are prevented from recovering
damages due to the difficulty of identifying a specific defendant or
defendants. Lead poisoning is a very real and widespread problem,
calling for the legal system's attention to devising a workable
solution. Just as medicine responds to a unique problem by
developing new treatments and preventive measures, the law must
respond to the problem of residential lead poisoning by developing
fair and innovative theories of collective liability. This article
examines collective liability theories, focusing on market share
liability, and proposes a solution to the problem encountered by
victims such as Julie and Monica.
The Problem with Lead Poisoning
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), located
in Atlanta, Georgia, considers childhood lead poisoning one of
today's most serious societal childhood diseases.5 Lead poisoning is
particularly detrimental to children under the age of six because
lead impedes development of a young child's central nervous
system.6 Approximately 930,000 children in the United States under
the age of six have elevated levels of lead in their blood.
7
Elevated blood lead levels can lead to a variety of health
4. HUD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 5.
5. CENTERS FbR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PREVENTING LEAD POISONING IN YOUNG
CmLDREN, A STATEMENT BY THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 1 (1991) C'CDC STATEmENT*). The
CDC STATEmENr sets blood lead levels above which medical intervention is required. CDC
STATEmENT at 1. Blood lead levels are measured in micrograms per whole deciliter of blood
('pg/d'). IL The intervention level was lowered in 1991 from 25 pgd to 10 pW/dL Id.
. CDC STATEmENT, supra note 5, at 7.
7. HUD REPoRT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 5. The number of identified
lead-poisoned children has decreased over the past three to five years. Id, Data taken from
the years 1988-1991 indicates that 1.7 million children, aged one to five years, had blood lead
levels greater than 10 pg/dL Id. Lead poisoning is a particular problem in the
African-American community and in urban areas. Id, For example, data collected in
1988-1991 indicates that approximately 36.7% of African-American children, aged one to five,
living in large cities had elevated blood lead levels Id. The most recent data, collected
during the years 1991-1994, reveals that 2296 of these children had elevated blood lead levels.
Id, This figure compares to an overall rate of lead poisoning of 8.9% for the years 1988-1991,
and an overall rate of approximately 596 for the years 1991-1994. I1.
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problems, many of which are permanent. Lead primarily affects the
neurological system, often resulting in decreased intelligence and
ability to learn.8 Lead poisoning can also damage an individual's
reproductive, cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, and renal systems, as
well as the bones.9 At extreme levels (in excess of 100 pg/dl), death
may result.10
The Scope of the Problem
The federal government banned the use of residential lead-based
paint in 1978.11 Approximately seventy-seven million homes were
constructed before 1980, fourteen million of which housed at least
one child under the age of seven. 2 Among these homes,
approximately 12.5 million contained some lead-based paint.
3
These statistics clearly indicate that although the reported
incidence of lead poisoning among young children is decreasing,
the problem remains immense. With nearly one million known
cases of childhood lead poisoning in the United States today,
coupled with seventy-seven million homes containing some form of
lead paint, it is evident that the problem of childhood lead
poisoning will persist as a major social problem.
Under traditional tort liability theories, many of these children
and their parents will have no legal recourse due to their inability
to determine which manufacturer caused the harm. As a result,
they may be forced to rely on a collective liability theory for
recovery.
8. David E. Jacobs, CI, The Health Effects of Lead on the Human Body, LmAD
PEwspwnrws, NovJDec. 1996, at 10. There appears to be a close correlation between elevated
blood lead levels and LQ. test results. Id. For every increase in blood lead level of 10 pa/dl,
there is a corresponding drop of two to four LQ. points. Id. At levels in excess of 30 pgdl,
further neurologic problems, such as retardation, seizures, and behavioral changes are often
present Id. at 10-11.
9. Id. at 11-12.
10. Id. at 12. Deaths from residential lead poisoning are extremely rare, with only three
deaths reported between the years 1979 and 1988. Id&
11. 16 C.F.R §§ 1303.1-.4 (1997).
12. R Poirr ON THE NATiONAL SURvEy OF LEAD BASED PAwr iN HOUSING, WESTAT. INC.,
(1995) C'NATIONAL HOUSING REPO rr") at 2-3. The report shows that residential lead-based
paint is particularly a problem in lower income/lower-priced housing. Id. In 6096 of the
homes surveyed, the annual household income was less than $30,000. Id. Further, the market
value of 6296 of these homes was less than $80,000. Id.
13. Id. at 2-3.
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I COLLECTIVE LIAnxy THEORIES
Alternate Liability
The first collective liability theory, "alternate liability," was
adopted in the famous case of Summers v. Tice.14 In Summers, two
members of a hunting party fired their guns simultaneously in the
same direction, causing injury to the plaintiff's eye and lip.15
Because it was nearly impossible to determine which of the two
hunters had shot the plaintiff, the court shifted the burden of
proving the identity of the actual tortfeasor to the defendants.
Accordingly, the court held that as long as the defendants were
unable to exculpate themselves individually, they would be held
jointly and severally liable.16
Enterprise Liability
"Enterprise liability," another form of collective liability, is based
on an entire industry's wrongdoing viewed as a single enterprise. In
Hall v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours,17 this theory was applied to
explosives. In Hal, numerous children were injured in eighteen
separate accidents involving blasting caps. The explosions
destroyed most of the evidence that could have identified the
manufacturer of the caps."' The plaintiffs sued every national
manufacturer of blasting caps, as well as the industry trade
14. 199 P.2d I (CaL 1948).
15. Summers, 199 P.2d at 2.
16. Id. at 4-5. The court examined the relative positions of the parties in reaching its
decision, holding that in a case in which a plaintiff is innocent and the defendants are
negligent, equity requires the defendants to prove that they did not commit the tort. Id. at 4.
The court recognized that the defendants are most often in a better position to determine
who committed the act, and that failure to shift the burden of proof would often leave the
plaintiff without a remedy Id.
Joint and several liability refers to the liability of 'copromisors of the same performance
when each of them, individually, has the duty of fully performing the obligation, and the
obligee can sue all or any of them upon breach of performance." BLAcK's LAw DIcrIoNAmR 837
(6th ed. 1990).
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted the Summers holding. Section
433B(3) of the Restatement provides, in part:
(3) Where the conduct of two or more actors is torious, and it is proved that harm
has been caused to the plaintiff by one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which
one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused
the harm.
RESrATEMEm" (SECOND) OF Torrs, § 433B(3) (1965). The facts of Summers illustrate the
application of the above section. Id. § 433B, ilius. 9.
17. 345 F Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
18. HaU, 345 F. Supp. at 358.
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association, alleging that the defendants were jointly responsible
for failing to place warning labels on the explosives. 19
The Hall court held that the plaintiffs could maintain a cause of
action against the industry if:
(1) the defendants breached a duty of care owed to the
plaintiffs;2
(2) the plaintiffs proved a causal link between the group-created
harm and the injuries;
2'
(3) the plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
it was the caps of at least one of the defendants that caused the
injuries;22 and
(4) that the breach of duty was similar in nature and similar in
time.2 3
Concert of Action
A third form of collective liability, "concert of action," permits a
plaintiff to recover if that plaintiff can prove that a defendant
engaged in a common plan or scheme to commit a tort.24 Courts
have accepted concert of action theories in both diethylstilbestrol
("DES")25 litigation2 6 and in lead pigment litigation.27
19. Id.
20. Id. at 379. The duty that the industry breached was its alleged failure to adequately
warn of the dangers of the explosives. Id. at 374. Plaintiffs can prove an industry-wide
breach of that duty by demonstrating one of the following
1) an explicit agreement among the parties regarding warnings,
2) evidence of parallel conduct to support an inference of cooperation, or,
3) industry-wide compliance regarding the safety of the explosives.
Id at 374-75.
21. Ld.
22. Id. The plaintiffs in Hail admitted that the blasting caps may have been imported
from Canada or produced by defunct American corporations. Id.
23. Hail, 345 F Supp. at 380.
24. W. PAGE KEEMN Er AL, PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE LAW OF Toirrs, § 46 (5th ed.
1984). The authors further state that-
All those who, in pursuance of a common plan of design to commit a tortious act, or
actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or
encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt the wrongdoer's acts done for
their benefit, are equally liable.
Id.
25. "DES" was a drug developed to prevent miscarriages in pregnant women that was
prescribed between the 1940's and the 1970's. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924,
925 (Cal. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). A side effect of the drug was a rare type of
cancer, adenocarcinoma. Id. An "adenocarcinoma" is a malignant adenoma arising from a
glandular organ. TAER's CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DIcIONARY 39 (17th ed. 1993). An "adenoma" is
a new and unusual formation of glandular tissue. Id, at 40.
26. Bichler v. Eli Lilly, 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y 1982).
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In Bicher, the plaintiff sued only one manufacturer of DES, Eli
Lilly, even though the pharmacy dispensing DES to the plaintiff was
supplied by 147 separate manufacturers.a In upholding a jury
award of $500,000, the court discussed two discrete theories of
concert of action: concerted action by agreement; and concerted
action by substantial assistance. 29 After reviewing the record, the
court found sufficient evidence to support either of these theories.3°
In Lead Industries, plaintiffs brought suit against five
manufacturers of lead pigment, alleging that the manufacturers sold
and manufactured lead-based paint for residential use despite their
knowledge of its harmful effects.3' The court held that a
manufacturer who "substantially contributes" to an injury due to
agreement or cooperation with other manufacturers to conceal the
dangers of lead pigment may be found jointly and severally liable.Y
Market Share Liability
The final form of collective liability is commonly referred to as
"market share liability." Market share theories apportion liability
according to a particular defendant's share of the market. Applying
this theory primarily in the context of DES litigation, courts have
promulgated various market share theories to apportion liability
among industry defendants.
II. MARKEr SHARE LiABumrY - A SIWPLE SOLUTION?
In General
When a court endeavors to formulate a collective liability theory
27. The City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 597 N.YS.2d 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
28. Bichler, 436 N.E.2d at 184.
29. Id at 188. In Bicher, "concerted action by agreement" referred to Eli Lilly's and
other drug companies' consciously parallel conduct in marketing DES for human
consumption without first testing the drug on mice. Id. "Concerted action by substantial
assistance" required a finding that Eli Lillys failure to test the drug on mice substantially
assisted or encouraged other drug companies to follow Lilly's lead in not initially testing the
drug on mice. Id.
30. Id. at 188-89. Specifically, the court pointed to the fact that between 1947 and 1948
there were eight companies who filed New Drug Applications with the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") to market DES. Each of these applications relied on the same
scientific evidence and requested approval to market DES tablets of the same dosage. Id.
The court held that a reasonable fact finder could conclude, on the basis of this evidence,
that an implied agreement among the companies existed, or that these filings encouraged
other drug companies to market and manufacture DES. Id. at 189.
31. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
32. Id. In this case, cooperation was evidenced by the lead pigment manufacturers'
trade association's promulgation of a plan to mislead both the public and the government. Id.
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based, at least in part, on market share, it must address several key
issues before determining whether the plaintiff will be able to
sustain a cause of action. First, the court must determine whether
a plaintiff can recover against a particular defendant or set of
defendants. Second, the court must determine the geographic scope
of the market, in terms of its national, regional, or local character.
Finally, the court must determine whether and under what
conditions it will allow a defendant to exculpate itself. Various
state courts have developed a range of theories apportioning
liability when plaintiffs fail to identify the manufacturer of a
harmful or dangerous product.
Various Market Share Theories
California
A market share theory of collective liability was first articulated
by the California Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott Labs.3 In
Sindell, the plaintiff brought a class action against ten DES
manufacturers.34 The trial court granted the defendants' demurrer1
to the complaint, dismissing the action because the plaintiff failed
to identify which manufacturer produced the DES she ingested.e
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed, adopting what it
characterized as an expansion of the theory of alternate liability
first adopted in Summers.Y
In Sindell, the court reasoned that although Summers was not
33. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal 1980).
34. SindeU, 607 P.2d at 925. The SindeU Plaintiff class consisted of "girls and women
who are residents of California and who have been exposed to DES before birth and who
may or may not know that fact or the dangers to which they were exposed." d at 925 n.1.
The action was brought against a group of defendant drug companies who manufactured
DES after 1941. Id,
35. A "demurrer" is "an allegation of a defendant, which, admitting the matters of fact
alleged by complaint of bill (equity action) to be true, shows that ... they are insufficient
for the plaintiff to proceed upon or to oblige upon the defendant to answer.... "BLAciKs
LAw DICnoNARY 432-33 (6th ed. 1990).
36. SindeU, 607 P.2d at 926. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice
because the plaintiff could not identify the specific manufacturer of the DES she ingested.
ICL
37. Id, at 931. The court distinguished between the factual situations in Summers and
SindeU. Id at 930-31. In Summers, both potential wrongdoers were before the court. Id at
930. Conversely, in SindeU, not all of the 200 potential wrongdoers were named as
defendants. Id, at 931. The SindeU defendants argued that a direct application of the
Summers rule placed an unfair burden on them because there was a substantial likelihood
that none of them committed the tort. Id. The California court agreed with this argument,
and adopted what it called an "adaptation" of the Summers rule. Id
Vol. 36:79
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directly applicable to the facts of Sindell, courts may craft theories
to resolve product identification problems caused by the creation
of fungible goods8 such as DES.3 The court stated that defendants
who were negligent in the production and marketing of DES should
bear the cost of the injury, rather than imposing the cost on
innocent plaintiffs. 4° The court held that a plaintiff may proceed
under a market share theory if-
(1) all defendants produced a drug from an identical formula;
(2) the manufacturer of the drug which caused the injury cannot be
identified through no fault of the plaintiff; and
(3) the named defendants in the action comprise a "substantial share" of the
relevant market
4 .
If the plaintiff meets these requirements, liability will be
apportioned among the named defendants according to each
defendant's market share.42 Any named defendants, may, in turn,
join other DES manufacturers.4 Further, a particular manufacturer
can exculpate itself completely if it can prove that its product
could not have caused the plaintiff's injuries.44
The SindeU court failed to specifically address the issue of the
scope of the relevant market Although the court acknowledged the
difficulties in defining "the market" and determining market share,
it declined to establish any fixed standards because the issue was
not yet ripe, the case being still at the pleading stage.4
38. "Fungible goods" are goods that are interchangeable or "of such a kind or nature
that one specimen or part may be used in place of another specimen or equal part...."
WaBmsa's Niwn NEw CoL iATE DicrioNy 499 (9th ed. 1989).
39. SindeU, 607 P.2d at 936.
40. Id. The court noted that, although the evidence may be insufficient to prove
causation, the defendants' actions in producing and selling DES, a drug causing latent
injuries, provided a substantial reason for the unavailability of that evidence at trial. Id.
41. Id. at 936-37. The court did not define a 'substantial share" of the market, and
specifically declined to adopt the suggestion appearing in a law review article that the
percentage of total market joined should be 7596-80% Id. at 937 (referencing Comment, DES
and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 Fore)HAm L RE. 963, 966 (1978)).
42. Sindei, 607 R2d at 937.
43. Id.
44. Id. For example, a defendant could show that it began producing the drug after the
injury occurred, or stopped producing the drug prior to the prospective mother's ingestion.
Id,
45. Id. at 938. The court recognized that it would probably be impossible for a jury to
determine the exact relationship between market share and liability, but reasoned that the
liability of each manufacturer was approximately equivalent to its culpability. Id at 937. The
court likened this situation to one in which a jury apportions fault, concluding that minor
discrepancies do not "seriously militate against the rule" adopted. Id. at 938.
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Wisconsin
In Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., the Wisconsin Supreme Court faced
the same issue confronted by the Sindell court in California 48
Although the Collins court ultimately allowed the plaintiffs to
proceed under market share theory, the court rejected the Sindell
approach, because of the difficulty in determining the actual
market share of each defendant. 47 The court found that an accurate
market share determination would be nearly impossible and
wasteful of judicial resources.48
In response to these problems, the Collins court formulated what
one commentator referred to as a "risk contribution theory."8 While
the decision concerned DES, the court clearly stated that it could
be applied to other situations as well. 5° Risk contribution theory
requires the plaintiff to prove the following elements against a
single defendant
(1) the plaintiff-mother ingested DES;
(2) the DES caused her subsequent injuries;
(3) the defendant produced or marketed the type of DES ingested by
plaintiff-mother, and
(4) the defendant's conduct in producing or marketing DES constituted a
breach of a legally recognized duty.
51
The court emphasized that plaintiffs need not prove any facts
related to the temporal or geographic market of DES.62 If the
plaintiff proves the above elements, she is entitled to recover all
damages. Moreover, if the plaintiff names only one defendant, that
46. 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984).
47. Colins, 342 N.W.2d at 48. The court pointed to several factors supporting its
contention that individual market share is difficult to determine accurately lid. at 48. The
court indicated that (1) many of the drug companies have gone out of business; (2) the
still-existing companies do not always maintain records; (3) if records do exist, they may not
be accurate; and (4) there are no accurate national statistics pertaining to DES market share.
48. Id. If market share is determinable, however, it must be one of the factors
considered in determining liability. Id.
49. Shirley IL Fang, Comment, Santiago v. Sherwin-Wiliams Co.: Rejection of Market
Share Liability in Lead-Based Paint Litigation, 43 BUFF. L REV. 725, 735 (1995).
50. Co/lins, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
51. Id. at 50. While an identification of the "type" of DES produced might seem
contradictory if a plaintiff cannot identify the manufacturer, use of this term by the
Wisconsin court refers to "color, shape, markings, size, or other identifiable characteristics."
Id. The court further clarified the identification requirement by holding that if a plaintiff
cannot identify the "type" of DES ingested, the plaintiff must only prove that the defendant




defendant is deemed responsible for all damages suffered.53 If,
however, the plaintiff names more than one defendant, the plaintiff
may recover a share of the damages from each defendant
proportionate to the percentage of liability assigned by the jury.54
The court provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to be
considered in determining liability shares:
(1) whether the drug company conducted pre-distribution safety tests;
(2) the defendant's role in obtaining FDA approval of the product;
(3) the defendant's market share in the relevant geographic area;
(4) the defendant's role in marketing DES;
(5) whether the defendant issued warnings regarding DES;
(6) whether DES was produced after the defendant knew, or should have
known, of the dangers of DES; and
(7) whether the company took affirmative steps to reduce the danger to
consumers.n
Once all defendants are named or impleaded,56 the case can then
proceed to trial under either negligence57 or strict liability theory.58
53. Id, at 51. The court, while holding that it is only necessary to proceed against a
single defendant, recognized the practical reality that plaintiffs will almost certainly join as
many defendants as possible. Id If a plaintiff proceeded against only one defendant and
could not prove her case, the plaintiff would be barred from bringing a case against
additional defendants later because of the statute of limitations. Id In addition, the ruling
allows named defendants to implead other defendants to ensure that liability is distributed as
fairly as possible. Id.
54. Id. at 50-51.
55. CoUins, 342 N.W.2d at 53.
56. To "implead" is to "[tlo sue; to prosecute. To bring a new party into [an] action on
[the] ground that new party is, or may be, liable to party who brings him in, for all or part or
part of the subject matter claim." BLAcics LAW DICTIONARY 754 (6th ed. 1990).
57. Couins, 342 N.W.2d at 51. When proceeding under negligence theory, the plaintiff
must prove the standard elements of negligence: that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty
of care, and that the defendant breached that duty and that the plaintiff suffered damage. Id.
"Risk contribution" theory replaces the traditional fourth element of proximate legal
causation. Id.
58. Id. To proceed under strict liability theory, the court requires the plaintiff to prove:
(1) that the DES was defective when it left the possession or control of the drug
company;,
(2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer,
(3) that the defect was the cause of the plaintiff's injuries or damages;
(4) that the drug company engaged in the business of producing or marketing DES
... ;and
(5) that the product was one which the company expected to reach the consumer
without substantial change in the condition it was when sold.
Id. at 51.
In concluding that plaintiffs can proceed under strict liability, the Wisconsin court rejected
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, comment k I& at 52. Section 402A imposes a
strict liability standard upon producers or manufacturers who sell unreasonably dangerous
products. REsrATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRs, § 402A, cmt k. Comment k provides in pertinent
90 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 36:79
The Collins court acknowledged that allocation of liability is a
difficult task for juries, but held that the risk contribution method
constitutes the best approach to ensure proportionate liability
according to relative fault.9
The Collins court rejected the plaintiff's claim for punitive
damages.60 The court concluded that because the application of risk
contribution theory (or any other market share theory, for that
matter) fails to assess damages with the requisite degree of




In 1984, the Washington Supreme Court modified the Sindell
approach to market share theory in Martin v. Abbott Labs.6
Characterizing Sindell as "conceptually attractive," the court
nevertheless rejected Sindell's holding because it failed to define
"substantial share of the market." In addition, the Martin court
found that the Sindell approach distorted market share theory by
holding a substantial share of the market liable for one hundred
percent of the plaintiff's injuries.64 Instead, the court adopted the
Collins risk contribution theory,6 by requiring plaintiffs to name
only one defendant.6
part:
k Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products, which, in the present state
of human knowledge are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. .... The seller of
such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and
marketed, is not to be held to strict liability for the unfortunate consequences
attending to their use...
Ild.
59. CoUins, 342 N.W.2d at 53.
60. Id, at 54.
61. Id
62. 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984).
63. Martin, 689 P2d at 380.
64. Id, at 381 (emphasis added). The Washington Court opined that under its reading of
SindeU, a legitimate argument could be made that the California court intended liability to be
joint and several. Id. at 380-81. Joint and several liability, however, was later rejected in
favor of only several liability by the California Supreme Court Brown v. Superior Court, 751
P.2d 470 (Ca. 1988).
65. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
66. Martin, 689 P.2d at 382. See supra note 55 and accompanying text Despite the
presence of factors identical to those in CoUins, the Martin court's holding does not appear
to lessen the requirement that the plaintiff identify the "type' of DES manufactured by the
defendant. Martin, 689 P2d at 382. The court reasoned that the "type' of DES ingested
should be known to the plaintiff. Il
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The court also determined that named defendants are presumed
to have equal shares of the market; however, they may implead
other manufacturers to reduce their presumptive market share.67 A
defendant may then exculpate itself by proving that (1) it did not
produce the type of DES ingested by the mother, (2) it did not
market DES in the particular geographic market, or (3) it did not
market DES during the time period in question.6s A defendant who
cannot exculpate itself becomes part of the plaintiff's presumptive
market and is presumed to have an equal market share.6 A
defendant remaining in the presumptive market pool may then
introduce evidence to reduce its presumptive market share. If a
defendant successfully proves a lower share, the remaining
defendants' shares are adjusted upward so that the total market
still equals one hundred percent. If all defendants can demonstrate
a market share less than the presumptive market share assigned,
the plaintiff may not recover one hundred percent of any damages
awarded.70 Finally, the court held that "the market" should be
defined as narrowly as possible.
71
Florida, with minor variations, adopted the Martin approach in
Conley v. Boyle Drug Co.2 In Conley, the court held that prior to
applying this approach, a plaintiff must show a genuine attempt to
locate the actual manufacturer. Additionally, the court limited the
use of market share theory to only those cases alleging negligence,
specifically holding that the theory is not applicable to strict
67. Id. at 382-83.
68. IA at 382.
69. Id. at 383. At this stage, defendants are liable for the portion of the damages
representing their shares of the presumptive market Id.
70. Id. The court used the following examples to illustrate the theory. In each of the
examples there are two defendants, X and Y, and the plaintiffs damages are $100,000.
Example 1: X and Y have presumptive market shares of 5096 each. Neither X nor Y
can prove a lower share. ResuU: X and Y are liable for $50,000 each.
Example 2: X and Y have presumptive market shares of 5096 each. X proves that its
market is actually 2096. Y's presumptive share is adjusted to 8096. Y cannot prove a
lower share. Redu/t. X is liable for $20,000 and Y is liable for $80,000.
Exampe 3: X and Y have presumptive market shares of 5096 each. X proves that its
market is actually 2096. Y's presumptive share is adjusted to 8096. Y proves that its
market share is actually 6096. Remit X is liable for $20,000, Y is liable for $60,000.
PlaintiWs total recovery is less than the total damages awarded.
Id. at 383.
71. Martin, 689 R2d at 383. The -relevant market" is defined according to the
"specificity of the evidence" focusing on the geographic area in which the plaintiff lived, the
type of DES marketed in that area, when the DES was ingested, and the types of DES
marketed during the period of time the plaintiff ingested DES. Id.
72. 570 So. 2d 275 (FU 1990).
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New York
New York adopted a broad and liberal market share theory in
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, Co.74 After evaluating all collective liability
theories, the Hymowitz court adopted a national market share
theory that requires the plaintiff to prove only that she ingested
DES, and as a result, sustained injuries.75 The plaintiff need not
prove that the defendant marketed the type of DES ingested by the
plaintiff.76
Under a national market share theory, a defendant's ability to
exculpate itself is extremely limited.77 In a national market, liability
is apportioned according to the overall risk rather causation in a
single case.78 Thus, the court held, defendants can only exculpate
themselves if they can prove that they did not manufacture or
market DES for pregnancy use. 79 As a result, these defendants
cannot exculpate themselves, even if it appears that the defendants
did not cause the plaintiff's injuries.8°
73. Conmy, 570 So. 2d at 286.
74. 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y 1989).
75. HymowUitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1077-78. In adopting national market theory, the
Hymowitz court in New York noted the same problems that California courts confronted in
pinpointing a DES market narrower than national in scope. Id. at 1076. The court rejected
the SindeU approach, disagreeing with the California court's conclusion that, over the long
run, degree of liability will approximate degree of causation. Id. at 1078. See aLso KEmrON gr
AL. supra note 24. The court also rejected the Martin approach, finding that the Martin
requirement that "the market" be defined as narrowly as possible was too constricting.
Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078.
Further, the court rejected the Colins approach, deciding that although application of this
theory on a limited basis may be possible, it was not applicable in New York. Id. at 1077. At
the time of the Hymowitz decision, New York had hundreds of DES cases pending. The
court reasoned that the individual assessment of liability required by Collins was both
impractical (from the standpoint of judicial resources) and that application of that theory
would almost certainly create inconsistent results. Id. at 1077-78.
76. I at 1078. The court reasoned that a windfall would result if a large DES
producer escaped liability merely because a smaller producer manufactured a pill with a
unique color or shape. Id. Rather, the court concluded that the broad national market theory
more accurately reflected the culpability of each defendant. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id For example, because of the national market, if a manufacturer made DES for
use during pregnancy, but did not market it in a particular geographic area, the manufacturer
might still be found liable even if the plaintiff only purchased DES in that particular
geographic market Id.
79. Id.
80. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078. It was under this standard, even if a defendant can
show that it did not market DES during the time ingested by the plaintiff-mother, it cannot
exculpate itself. I&
Apportioning Liability
The Hymowitz court also held that liability is several under
national market theory.81 Although a plaintiff may collect less than
one hundred percent of the damages awarded by the jury, the court
determined that the equitable trade-off between limited
exculpability (favoring plaintiffs) and several liability (favoring
defendants) was fair.8
Analyzing the Theories
A fair and equitable application of market share theory should
not favor either plaintiffs or defendants. When considering
applicability of a market share theory, a court must first examine at
least four separate criteria common to all theories before rendering
a decision. The decisions a court makes on each criterion will
generally favor either the plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, it is
critical that the court balance these decisions to ensure fair and
equitable treatment of the litigants.
How Many Defendants Must be Sued?
The first factor a court must consider when developing a market
share theory is the number of defendants a plaintiff must sue.
Several options are available. For example, a court can direct a
plaintiff to sue the entire market, a "substantial share" of the
market,8 or a single defendant.8
With respect to market share theory, a court, in all fairness,
cannot require a plaintiff to name every manufacturer in the
market. In fact, no court has held this to be a prerequisite.
Although the "substantial share" requirement seems to be a fair
compromise, adopting this standard could lead to uncertainty
regarding what constitutes a "substantial share," and lead to
inconsistent judicial interpretation. A court in State A, for example,
might decide that fifty-one percent constitutes a substantial share,
81. Id.
82. Id at 1078. The Hymowitz court made no reference to the number of defendants
that must be named by a plaintiff to maintain an action. However, in light of the fact that
liability is several only, it clearly behooves plaintiffs to sue as great a percentage of the
national market as possible.
83. SindeU, 607 P2d at 937. The Sindell court reasoned that this somewhat arbitrary
requirement greatly lessens the 'injustice of shifting the burden of proof to the defendants."
Id.
84. See CoUins, 342 N.W.2d at 50; Martin, 689 R2d at 368; Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at
1069. Although the Hymowitz decision does not state explicitly that only one defendant need
be named, the fact that the decision allows recoveries of less than 10096 clearly implies that
conclusion. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1069.
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while a court in State B might determine that eighty percent
represents a substantial share. Sindell offers no clear guidance to
practitioners on this issue.1
The best option available to avoid potentially inconsistent
interpretations is to allow the plaintiff to name a single defendant.
While this option is plaintiff-oriented, it can be offset by other
criteria. Further, from a practical point of view, plaintiffs will
almost certainly "find it preferable to sue as many defendants as
can be identified as having possible liability."6
Liability/Damages
The type of liability alleged and the question of whether a
plaintiff can necessarily recover one hundred percent of the
damages awarded are also critical factors for a court's
consideration. Due to the close relationship between these factors,
they cannot be analyzed separately. Three separate types of liability
are available under market share theory: (1) joint and several
liability; (2) strict several liability; and (3) modified several liability.
If liability is joint and several, the plaintiff can seek the entire
amount of the damages from any one defendant That defendant, in
turn, will generally institute a contribution action against its other
co-defendants.8 7 Further, if liability is joint and several, the plaintiff
will be able to collect one hundred percent of the damages
awarded.
On the other hand, if the liability theory pursued is strict several
liability, each defendant is only liable for damages assigned to it by
the finder of fact.8 This is particularly important in a market share
context in which damages paid are apportioned according to the
defendant's market share. Because a plaintiff is unlikely to succeed
in proving causation by one hundred percent of the market, or
even name one hundred percent of the market, a plaintiff is
unlikely to collect one hundred percent of the damages.8
85. SindeU, 607 P.2d at 937 ("While 75% to 8096 of the market is suggested... we hold
only that a substantial percentage is required.").
86. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 51. If the plaintiff chooses to name only one defendant, the
named defendant will almost certainly implead other manufacturers. Id.
87. KEETON, supra note 24, § 50.
88. Id, § 47, at 327-28.
89. For example, suppose a plaintiff sues defendants A through E, and discovery
reveals that each of these defendants' market share is 1596. Each defendant is, therefore, only
liable for 1596 of the damages under market share theories utilizing strict several liability. The
plaintiff will recover (assuming that none of the defendants is able to exculpate itself) 7596 of
the damages awarded by the jury.
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The third option is modified several liability. The Collins and
Martin courts adopted modified versions of several liability. The
Martin court's "presumptive market share"9°  creates a
plaintiff-friendly liability system. Under a presumptive share system,
the plaintiff may be able to collect one hundred percent of
damages, unless each and every defendant in ,the presumptive
market can prove that its actual market share is less than its
presumptive share. Liability based on presumptive share clearly
favors plaintiffs. Presumptive share liability, however, particularly
disadvantages small-market defendants.9'
The Collins risk apportionment system is perhaps the most
plaintiff-friendly method yet proposed.9 This type of liability system
does not use market share as a determinative factor, therefore, this
system guarantees a plaintiff the opportunity to recover one
hundred percent of the damages awarded.93
When considering liability and damages under a market share
theory, courts must answer a fundamental question: Which party
should bear the burden of proving market share? Although the
plaintiff usually bears the burden of proof, defendants are almost
certainly in a better position to determine actual market share.
Corporate defendants have access to sales data and possess the
resources to collect, compile, and analyze that data. Conversely,
90. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
91. Under the Martin modified several liability system, the following situation could
result Assume four defendants, A through D, in the presumptive market. Each defendant is
initially presumed to have 2596 of the market In reality, the market is apportioned as
follows: A = 1% - B = 14% - C = 3096 - D = 559.
Initially neither C nor D have any incentive to prove their actual market share. If A can
prove its actual market share is 1 percent, the presumptive market is now- A = 1% -B =
33% - C = 33% - D - 33%.
Now B and C have incentive to prove their actual market share, but D still has no
incentive because its actual market share is less than its presumptive share. If both B and C
can prove their actual market shares are 14% and 30%, respectively, the presumptive market
now matches the actual market: A = 1% - B = 14% - C = 3096 - D = 55M.
This system allows the most responsible defendant (D) to ride on the coattails of A, B,
and C. Under this liability system, the largest defendant (D) is never required to affirmatively
prove its market share. Conversely, the smaller a defendant's actual market share, the more
imperative for that defendant to prove its actual market share. Because it is likely that a
larger defendant has the most information available, it profits from withholding that
information.
92. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
93. The Hymowitz court correctly rejected this system, pointing to the morass of
litigation that large-scale market share cases would present. Hymountz, 539 N.E.2d at
1077-78. The court implied that the great expenditures of time and money required to
determine relevant market shares made it unlikely that plaintiffs could afford to bring small
scale market share cases. Id.
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plaintiffs are not usually in the position to know the particulars of
market share, nor do they generally have the ability to assimilate
the necessary data. In light of the fact that the plaintiffs in
lead-based paint cases are primarily innocent children and the
defendants are large corporations that have probably profited from
the sale of a dangerous product, public policy also favors shifting
the burden of proving market share to the defendants.
Scope of Market
Courts must next consider the geographic scope of the market.
Courts can adopt a definition of "market" that is as broad as
possible (the national market concept of Hymowitz94), or as
narrow as possible (as suggested by Martin95). From a practical
standpoint, in many cases, there is little difference between the two
approaches. If a court adopts the Martin approach, evidence of
market share may not be available for any market except a national
market! 6 It makes little sense, therefore, to choose an extremely
narrow market and conduct months or years of discovery on
determining market share, only to discover that an accurate
assessment is impossible. Although in some instances reliable data
may exist to precisely identify a narrow market, utilization of a
national market analysis is more sensible because it is more likely
that accurate national market data is available for review.
Exculpation
Finally, a court must consider whether a particular defendant can
avoid liability. Again, a range of options is available. A court can
adopt a broad view of exculpation as demonstrated by both the
Sindell and Martin decisions. 7 Conversely, a court can limit
94. Id, at 1077.
95. Martin, 689 P2d at 605.- Specifically, Martin requires the market to be defined as
narrowly as possible according to the "specificity of the evidence." ld,
96. The Hymowitz court noted that California courts had extreme difficulty in
determining market share when a narrow market was used. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1070.
After years of litigation, it was finally determined that the most practical market to use (at
least in DES cases) was a national market. Id
97. See SindeU, 607 P.2d at 937 (holding that '[e]ach defendant will be held liable for
the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of the market unless it demonstrates
that it could not have made the product that caused plaintiff's ijuries."); Martin, 689 P.2d at
382 (holding that "[i]ndividual defendants are entitled to exculpate themselves ... by
establishing... that they did not produce or market the particular type DES... ; that they
did not market the in the geographic market area where the plaintiff mother obtained the
drug; or that it did not distribute DES in the time period of plaintiff mother's ingestion of the
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exculpation to an extremely narrow set of circumstances, as
demonstrated by Hymowitz.m
While the Hymowitz court equated limited exculpation with a
national market,°9 limited exculpation was adopted primarily to
offset the court's decision to adopt strict several liability as part of
its theory.1°° A court could adopt a national market theory, and still
allow a defendant to exculpate itself if it can prove its product
could not have caused the damage. A court could also reach a
middle ground by requiring a defendant to produce clear and
convincing evidence that it could not have caused the injuries in
question.
IV. APPLICATION OF MARKET SHARE IN LEAD PIGMENT CASES
Cases to Date
Most courts that are asked to apply market share liability in lead
pigment cases have declined to do so. For example, the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed
this issue in Santiago v. Sherwin-WiUiams Co., 101 and refused to
apply market share liability in lead pigment cases because there
was no "signature injury"1°2 in these cases; the scope of the lead
pigment market was too broad; and the defendants were bulk
suppliers of raw material, not the actual manufacturers of the
hazardous product.10
The court reasoned that because the purpose of market share
drug.").
It appears that each of the situations set forth in Martin meet the rather general Sindel
requirement One of the Martin factors allows exculpation if a defendant can prove that it
did not market the product in the geographic area in which the plaintiff lived. If a national
market were chosen, it would be impossible for a defendant to satisfy this factor because
the geographic area would be nationaL
98. See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078. Hymowitz limited exculpation in DES
litigation solely to defendants not marketing DES for use during pregnancy. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id,
101. 782 F Supp. at 186 (D.Mass. 1992).
102. Santiago, 782 F Supp. at 192. The court contrasted lead pigment cases with DES
cases, pointing to the fact that adenocarcinoma is "directly attributable to exposure to DES,"
whereas problems associated with residential lead-based paint exposure are also attributable
to heredity as well as other environmental factors. Id.
103. Id. at 192-95. The district court focused on the Sindell theory in analysing market
share liability. Id. at 189-90. The court mentioned other theories only in a footnote. Id. at 190
n.4. In the note, however, the court misinterpreted SindeU by stating that all defendants will
be responsible for 10096 of the injuries suffered, even if 10096 of the possible defendants are
not parties to the suit. Id. This analysis was examined and rejected by the California
Supreme Court four years earlier in Brown.
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theory is to eliminate the proof of causation requirement, and there
is no signature injury related to lead ingestion, the question of
causation remains, rendering market share theories inappropriate in
lead pigment cases. 104 The court described differences in defining
market scope when comparing DES and lead pigment cases. In
DES litigation, it is only necessary to determine the applicable
market for a period of approximately nine months (the length of a
woman's pregnancy). Conversely, in lead pigment litigation, it is
often necessary to determine market shares in a temporal market
spanning decades. 105 Because some defendants entered and exited
the market during this time span, the court reasoned that juries
would be unable to make an accurate determination of market
shares beyond a preponderance of the evidence.1°6 Finally, the
court explained that because the defendant pigment manufacturers
were only bulk suppliers, they could not control the ultimate use of
their product. °7
Federal courts applying Pennsylvania law considered and
rejected market share theories in lead pigment litigation in 1992
and 1993.1l 8 The Hurt and City of Philadelphia courts surveyed
Pennsylvania law on the subject of market share liability, and
discovered only one trial court decision utilizing this theory. Due to
the apparent reluctance of Pennsylvania courts to adopt a market
share theory, the Hurt and City of Philadelphia courts concluded
that the plaintiffs could not proceed under that theory of liability.1w
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered market
104. Santiago, 782 F Supp. at 193. The court does not elaborate on this factor, stating
only that "[d]efendants have produced evidence to show that factors other than lead pigment
in paint were adequate producing causes of Santiago's inuries." Id.
105. Id at 194. The Santiago home was built in 1917. Thus, the market spanned a
period of over five decades. Id. An analysis of the paint in the Santiago home revealed it was
repainted at least five times after construction, the last time between the years 1955 and
1969. Id, Three of the five defendants named in Santiago had ceased producing lead pigment
by 1954; one additional defendant had stopped producing pigment by the late 1950's. Id.
Another defendant presented evidence that the lead pigment it produced was primarily used
in commercial applications beginning in the mid-1930's. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 195. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the plaintiff's
admissions that the paint manufacturerm (1) controlled the amount of lead pigment in their
paint; (2) knew the dangers of lead; and (3) controlled the warnings placed on paint
containers. Id. at 195.
,108. Hurt v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 806 F Supp. 515 (E.D. Pa. 1992); City of
Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993).
109. Hurt, 806 F Supp. at 534-36; Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F2d at 124-26. The Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County allowed the plaintiffs in a DES case to proceed under
SindeU's market share liability theory Erlich v. Abbott Labs, 5 Phila. 249 (C.P Phila. 1981).
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share liability in lead pigment litigation in Skipworth v. Lead Indus.
Ass'n.n0 In Skipworth, the court rejected the SindeU market share
approach, finding that the lead pigment market was far too
expansive during the time period at issue, and lead pigments are
not fungible."'
Following the Santiago court's reasoning,112 the Skipworth court
determined that the lengthy time frame would virtually guarantee
that certain pigment manufacturers would be held liable even
though they could not have possibly committed the harm." 3
Accordingly, the court held that the first prong of the SindeU test
could not be met because not all of the named defendants were
potential tortfeasors."
4
The court also concluded that lead pigments are not fungible.
The court based this conclusion on evidence tending to prove that
differing formulae of lead paint resulted in various levels of lead
internalization in the body."5 The court concluded that if it adopted
Sindell, two manufacturers with equal market shares would pay
equal damages. This result fails to consider the differing degrees of
harm each product may have caused." 6 The court concluded that it
110. 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997).
111. Skipwoarh, 690 A.2d at 172-73.
112. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
113. Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173. The residence in which the minor plaintiff allegedly
suffered lead poisoning was built around 1870, making the relevant time period
approximately 100 years. Id,
114. Id. at 172. The .Skipworth court added a fourth factor to the elements in SindeU,
requiring that all defendants be potential tortfeasors. I& Considering the exculpatory
provisions of SindeU, this factor does not appear to be necessary for accrual of liability. The
Pennsylvania court's conclusion that the SindeU test was not met because some of the
named defendants could not have caused the harm appears to be flawed. Causation
problems were the primary reason for the development of market share theories. Discovery
in such cases determines if a particular defendant is a potential tortfeasor. If discovery
reveals that a particular defendant is not a potential tortfeasor, the claims must be dismissed
against that defendant The plaintiff could then proceed against the remaining defendants.
SindeU does not contemplate dismissal of the plaintiff's case because some of the defendants
could not have committed the wrong; rather, the burden is on the defendants to prove
non-liability. SindeU, 607 P.2d at 937.
115. Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173. The Skipworth court focused on the different
formulae of lead paint. Id The court considered the "bioavaiability" of the lead in each
brand of paint. Id. "Bioavailability' refers to the degree to which lead pigment affects the
body. ld. at 173 n.5. Uncontested evidence revealed that different paint formulae caused
differing degrees of lead bioavailability. Therefore, if a child were to ingest two different
brands of lead paint in equal amounts, the increase in the child's lead levels would differ. I
The court concluded that even if market share data were available, the differing levels of
bioavailability in different brands of paint precludes an accurate apportionment of liability.
Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173.
116. Id
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could not adopt a market share theory because to do so "would
grossly distort [apportionment of] liability."
117
The only judicial decision to date allowing a plaintiff in a lead
pigment case to proceed under market share theory is Jackson v.
Glidden Co.118 Specifically, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that
plaintiffs may proceed under the SindeU approach if they can prove
that the accused lead pigment is completely fungible, and if a
substantial share of manufacturers are named in the suit.119 The
Jackson opinion offers only a cursory analysis of market share
theories, basing its holding on a prior Ohio case, Goldman v.
Johns-Manville.12° Ultimately, the Jackson court ruled that the
plaintiffs allegations were sufficient to satisfy the SindeU and
Goldman requirements, and denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss. 121
Comparing and Contrasting DES and Lead Pigment Cases
Market share theories have been utilized primarily in the context
of DES litigation. Courts have generally refused to apply market
share or other collective liability theories in lead pigment litigation
because of the supposed differences between lead pigment and
DES. Courts have highlighted three main differences between DES
and lead pigment.
No Signature Injury
Courts dispute the assertion that ingestion of lead pigment
produces a "signature injury." 122 Although science closely links
development of the rare cancer, adenocarcinoma, to the ingestion
of DES,123 a variety of possible causes exist for the symptoms of
117. Id. at 173.
118. 647 N.E.2d 879 (Ohio Ct App. 1995).
119. Jackson, 647 N.E.2d at 884. The case was before the Court of Appeals on a
motion to dismiss. The court's analysis focused only on whether the complaint was
sufficiently pled to withstand the motion, and did not analyze in any detail the requirements
of Sindell. Id. at 881.
120. 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987). The Goldman court held that the SindeU theory of
market share liability was a viable alternative to assess liability where the product in
question was fungible. Goldman, 514 N.E.2d at 702.
121. Jackson, 647 N.E.2d at 884.
122. See Santiago, 782 F Supp. at 192-93.
123. Nancy Lee Fhak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-in-Fac"
Alternative Forms of Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Scientiic Issues, 63 TEMP.
L Rav. 311, 334 (1990). The author noted that the issue of causation has never been raised in
DES cases, due to the proven scientific link between DES and adenocarcinoma Id. A similar
situation exists in asbestos cases in which mesothelioma, a rare form of lung cancer, is
Vol. 36:79
Apportioning Liability
lead poisoning, such as the mother's substance abuse during
pregnancy and genetic defects-"2
Indirect Suppliers
Next, courts distinguish lead pigment and DES because the
manufacturer of lead pigment is not the direct supplier of the
harmful product' 25 Courts tend to conclude that because lead
pigment manufacturers are merely bulk suppliers of lead, they have




Finally, and perhaps most significantly, courts emphasize the
temporal scope of the market 27 In a DES case, plaintiffs need only
determine the relevant market for a period of approximately nine
months. In a lead pigment case, the scope of the market will often
span decades.' 28 Over time, companies enter and exit the lead
pigment market. Courts have held that this uncertainty in the
marketplace precludes application of the Sindell market share
theory. 29
V. BRIDGING THE GA. A SUGGESTED PROPOSAL TO APPORTION
LIABILITY IN LEAD PIGMENT LITIGATION
The problems identified by courts criticizing market share
liability in lead pigment litigation are not insurmountable. There are
fair and equitable solutions to each problem presented. The
"already-existing market share theories" employed in DES cases
provide some solutions, while other legal principles furnish
alternative solutions. Once plaintiffs overcome these obstacles,
scientifically linked to asbestos exposure. Id, at 334 n.148.
124. See RAIER & MILNE, supra note 3, § 9.4.
125. See Santiago, 782 F Supp. at 194-95; Skipwrth, 690 A.2d at 173.
126. Santiago, 782 F Supp. at 195.
127. See id. at 194; Slcipworth, 690 A.2d at 172-73.
128. S7kipwort, 690 A.2d at 172. See supra note 113.
129. Santiago, 782 F Supp. at 194. The court concluded, "there is insufficient evidence
that would warrant a jury in finding that all defendants, or any of them, actively participated
in the lead pigment market for lead-based paint during the fifty-four year period involved
here.' Id.
"The difficulty in applying market share liability where such an expansive relevant time
period as one hundred years is at issue is that entities who could not have been producers
of the lead based paint which injured Skipworth would almost assuredly be held liable."
Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173.
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bridging the gap between DES cases and lead pigment cases is
feasible.
Problem: No signature injury.
Solution: Proof of injury causation.
Although a lead pigment plaintiff pursuing a market share theory
of liability need not specifically identify the pigment manufacturer
that caused the injury, the plaintiff, nevertheless, must prove the
causative role of lead, and that the source of the lead was
lead-based paint '3°
Problem: Defendants are bulk suppliers, therefore, they lack control over the
ultimate use of lead pigment
Solution: Allow actions to proceed under negligence theory only.
Defendants have argued that because they do not control the
ultimate use of lead pigment, they cannot control the risks of the
dangerous product'131 Although that argument may be acceptable in
a products liability action, it is not acceptable in a negligence
action.132
Market share theories relax the direct causation requirement.'
Lead pigment plaintiffs need not strictly prove this element
Knowledge of the risk of the conduct and foreseeability of the
harm both play an integral part in a negligence action. For liability
to accrue, a defendant must know (or should have known) that its
actions presented a risk;134 and the consequences of its acts or
omissions must have been foreseeable 35
Therefore, to proceed under market share theory and overcome
causation problems, a lead pigment plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)
130. This requirement is common to all negligence claims. For example, suppose X had
a pre-existing back condition. His car was struck from behind due to the negligent driving of
Y. To recover against Y for damages to his back, X is required to show that his irjuries were
caused by the accident, and not attributable to his pre-existing condition.
131. Santiago, 782 F Supp. at 195.
132. The elements of a negligence cause of action are well-known:
(1) a duty on the part of the defendant;
(2) a breach of that duty;,
(3) breach of the duty must have caused the plaintiffs injury;, and
(4) the plaintiff must have sustained damage.
KEErON, supra note 24, at § 30.
133. See generaUy SindeU, 607 P.2d at 936; Co/lins, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
134. K roN, supm note 24, at § 184.
135. Id. at 285. See also Pasgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), in
which Justice Cardozo stated. "If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an
act innocent and harmless, at least to outward seeming, with reference to her, did not take
to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong.... "Id at 99.
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the existence of a duty; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) knowledge of
the risk by the defendant pigment manufacturer, and (4) that the
harm suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the
manufacturer's negligent acts or omissions. 136
Problem: Broad temporal market
Solution: A standard for expert testimony.
Perhaps the most vexing problem facing a lead pigment plaintiff
proceeding under market share theory is the breadth of the
temporal market. If a court fails to adopt either presumptive share
or risk contribution theory, potential lead pigment plaintiffs are
placed at a distinct disadvantage compared to DES plaintiffs.
As discussed earlier, the temporal market for DES is necessarily
limited to nine months, whereas the temporal market in lead
pigment cases may span decades or a century or more.
Nonetheless, it is likely that sufficient data exists regarding the lead
pigment marketplace from which experts can draw valid
conclusions concerning market shares over this broad period of
time.137
In Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceutical,'3 the Supreme Court
of the United States formulated a four-part test to ensure the
relevance and reliability of scientific expert testimony:
(1) whether the scientific theory has been tested or is testable;
(2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review;
(3) the known (or possible) rate of error associated with the theory; and
(4) whether the theory is generally accepted in the scientific community.1
39
These factors were not intended to be exclusive, but rather
136. The dual questions of knowledge and foreseeability will likely be the subject of
much litigation. Several interesting facts are worth noting concerning the industry's
knowledge of the dangers of lead-based paint for residential use. In 1927, the United States
Department of Labor analyzed lead poisoning deaths during the 10-year period 1914-1924.
Deaths From Lead Poisoning, Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1 (1927).
This report specifically analyzed mortality statistics on painters, paint mixers, and children
under age 18. Id. at 18, 23, 30-31.
It is undisputed that the pigment manufacturers' trade association (the Lead Industries
Association) advertised the virtues of lead pigment for residential use. For example, a 1941
advertisement depicts a house painter, stating, "[plaints made of pure white lead resist
weather better - and the more white lead, the better the paint" Atvertisement, THE SAiiMAY
EVENING POST, April 12, 1941, at 91.
137. The Santiago court noted that the United States Federal Trade Commission
conducted an investigation into the market shares held by lead pigment manufacturers.
Santiago, 782 E Supp. at 194 n.13. While this investigation dealt with only a four-year time
span, the report exemplifies relevant market share information.
138. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
139. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 593-94.
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intended to guide lower courts in determining the admissibility of
expert scientific testimony.14 Although the Daubert test dealt
specifically with scientific testimony, the court did not limit its
application to scientific evidence alone.
141
Market share evidence in lead pigment cases is fundamentally
economic data that can certainly be classified as technical. Courts
have revisited the Daubert test, revising it to include technical
economic testimony.'4 Reformulations utilizing the Daubert factors,
if applicable, require that technical economic testimony be based
on valid statistical or economic methods.'" Furthermore, courts
must consider the reliability of the data used by the experts in
reaching their conclusions. As one commentator stated, "experts
must always be able to point to specific data on which their
testimony is based." 44
If an expert's methods meet the requirements of this modified
test, the expert's testimony is admissible; any ultimate computation
of market share is left to the finder of fact. Although the parties
may dispute the expert's conclusions, the methods (not the
conclusions) are the focus of any inquiry into the validity of the
expert testimony.'" Application of the modified Daubert test to
lead pigment cases eliminates the perceived problem of temporal
market breadth, ensuring that an expert's testimony is not "junk
economics."'"
140. Id. at 593.
141. Id. at 589-90. The court stated that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 should be the
primary focus in determining admissibility of expert testimony. This rule permits an expert
to testify if he has "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." Id. at 589 (quoting
FF. R EviD. 702).
142. See In re Aluminum Phosphate Litig, 893 F Supp. 1497 (D. Kan. 1995); State of
Ohio, ex rel. Montgomery v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F Supp. 1247 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
143. Aluminum Phosphate, 893 F Supp. at 1506; Louis Tauth Dairy, 925 F Supp. at
1251 n.3.
144. Jennifer Laser, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to NonscientIfic Expert Testimony, 30 LoY.
LA. L REv. 1379, 1414 (1997). The author stresses that a court's fundamental task is to
determine whether the data used by the expert is reliable. Id. This data can come from a
wide variety of sources, including the expert's personal experiences. Id.
145. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. The court also emphasized that the inquiry into expert
testimony should be flexible. Id, at 594.
146. Cases analyzing Daubert often refer to "junk science.' "Junk science" is generally
defined as "scientific evidence" not based on legitimate principles of science. Joiner v.
General Electric, 78 F3d 524, 530 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 118 S. CL 512
(1997). "Junk economics" is generally defined as economic evidence not based on legitimate




Bridging the Gap: A Suggested Proposal to Apportion Liability in
Lead Pigment Litigation
Courts should allow plaintiffs to proceed against manufacturers
of lead pigment under market share theory. Plaintiffs, however,
must be restricted to negligence theory. The plaintiff initially bears
the burden of proving that exposure to lead-based paint caused the
injuries. He or she must then demonstrate that the defendant owed
a duty to the plaintiff that the defendant breached. It is only when
the plaintiff -satisfies these threshold requirements that market
share theory can be substituted for the element of causation.
Under this proposed market share theory, plaintiffs are required
to name only one defendant, although they may name more. In
addition, the named defendant (or defendants) has the option to
implead other defendants. An impleaded defendant must be
available to present a defense to the court. If it is unavailable, the
impleader defendant must stand in place of the absent defendant
and present a defense on its behalf.
147
The relevant geographic market must be national. Defendants
must be given the opportunity to exculpate themselves if they can
show by clear and convincing evidence that their product could not
have caused the plaintiff's injuries. Liability must be several, rather
than joint. Any damages awarded must be apportioned according to
the ultimate market share attributable to the defendants. By
adopting these requirements, courts can adequately balance the
interests of plaintiffs and defendants alike. Plaintiffs benefit from
the standard of the national market, due to the high probability
that market share data will be available. Defendants benefit
because they may be able to exculpate themselves. Even if they are
unable, several liability limits liability to a percentage equal to their
ultimately determined market share.
The last element of the lead pigment market share test presents
the most difficult question: who bears the burden of proving the
defendant's market shares? Should a plaintiff be required to prove
the defendant's market share, or should the burden shift to the
defendant? Ultimately, comparing an innocent plaintiff with a
negligent defendant requires application of the Martin approach of
147. This requirement limits the practice of named defendants impleading unavailable
defendants. This problem occurred in Washington when named defendants impleaded
unavailable defendants in an attempt to reduce their presumptive market share. Hymowitz,
539 N.E.2d at 1077 n.1. The Supreme Court of Washington remedied this problem by




presumptive market share. 1  Regardless of whether a court
ultimately charges the plaintiff or the defendant with the burden of
proving market share, a modified Daubert test will filter out
statistics based on "junk economics."
CONCLUSION
Although no perfect solution to the problem of market share
liability in lead pigment litigation exists, courts should realize the
scope and nature of this very serious problem. The theory
proposed in Part V attempts to do justice to plaintiffs and
defendants alike by taking the strongest elements of
"already-existing DES market share" theories and molding them to
fit lead pigment litigation. Although not advocated as the ultimate
solution, perhaps the proposed theory will provide a starting point
on the path towards remedying the existing inequities. Without a
legal remedy for the problem of lead poisoning, innocent children
like Julie will continue to suffer damages with no opportunity to
seek justice.
Robert F Daley
148. See supra notes 63 -71 and accompanying text.
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